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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. 20000626-CA

v.
LARRY DEAN COLEMAN,

Priority No. 15

Defendant/Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

In addition to the facts and arguments contained in the State/Appellant's opening
brief, the State submits the following argument in reply to the points contained in
defendant/appellee's responsive brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
CORRECTNESS REVIEW IS APPLICABLE AS THE STATE DOES
NOT CHALLENGE THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT;
DEFENDANT'S CONCESSION OF A THREE-DAY ERROR
WARRANTS REVERSAL
A.

Review of the Determination of Whether "Good Cause" Exists Under
Section 77-29-1 is a Legal Question Reviewed for Correctness
The State appealed the dismissal with prejudice of three charges against defendant,

arguing that the trial court erred in determining that, as of the time of the hearing on
defendant's motion to dismiss, 114 days of the 120 days allowed under Utah Code Ann. §

77-29-1 (1999) had passed. The three miscalculations made by the trial court cover the
following dates: 1) March 27-30, 2000; 2) November 15-30, 1999; and 3) February 1-24,
2000.
Defendant erroneously claims that the State is challenging the trial court's findings
of fact underlying its dismissal of the charges against defendant, and faults the State for
failing to properly marshal the evidence supporting those findings, as would be required for
such a challenge. Br. of Aplee. at 11-13, 18-19, 25-26.
As to the March miscalculation, the trial judge erroneously believed that defendant
filed a motion to dismiss on March 30, and concluded that the time tolled on that date (R.
289:35). The State's opening brief points out that nothing in the record supports this
determination. Instead, the only qualifying motion filed by defendant at the time which
would have tolled the time would have been the motion to suppress filed on March 27 (R.
39-47). As no evidence supported the trial court's finding of a March 30 filing date, there
was nothing for the State to marshal. Further, defendant concedes that the trial court's
finding was clearly erroneous. Br. of Aplee. at 13 n.7. The effect of this concession is
discussed infra at subsection B.
The State does not challenge any underlying findings as to the remaining two periods
of miscalculation. The underlying procedural events are a matter of record. The dates and
contents of hearings and motions have been recorded and clearly demonstrate what occurred
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below. The trial judge did not make any factual findings which contradict the procedural
events in this case which gave rise to the dismissal.
Instead, the State challenges the trial court's verbal ruling, which is comprised of an
explanation of how the judge calculated the time upon which his dismissal order was based
and what may happen in the six days following the hearing (R. 289:32-37). As to the
November 1999 delay, the trial judge ruled that defendant's unusual request to have the
preliminary hearing set eighteen days beyond the period provided by statute did not toll the
running of the time period (R. 289:32, 34). Defendant's request is a matter of record, and
the judge made no findings of fact as to the request or the State's response thereto. He
simply made the legal determination that the request did not toll the time period. It is that
legal determination which the State challenges.
Similarly, as to the February 2000 delay, the trial judge held that the entirety of the
delay between January 20 and March 20 would not toll the running of the time period
because there was "no reason . . . not to count those 60 days" (R. 289:33-34). The judge
properly noted that the court "could not accommodate that [the preliminary hearing] at the
attorney's request" but made no specific findings as to the various causes of the delays during
that time. Again, the reasons for the delay are a matter of record, and the State does not
challenge those facts. The State only challenges the court's determination that the reason for
the delay from February 1 to February 24 did not toll the statutory time period.
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The only question on appeal is the propriety of the trial court's determination as to
whether or not what occurred below at each stage of the process tolled the running of the
120-day statutory period. That question is one of law reviewed on appeal for correctness.
See State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911, 914 (Utah 1998).
B.

March 27-30. 2000: Defendants Concession of a Three-Dav Error in the Trial
Court's Computation Warrants Reversal
Defendant concedes that the trial court erred in tolling the time period as of March 30,

2000, instead of March 27, as argued in the State's opening brief. Br. of Aplt. at 11-12; Br.
of Aplee. at 13 n.7. Consequently, as of the May 15, 2000, hearing on defendant's motion
to dismiss, there were at least nine, not six, days remaining under the trial court's calculation
of the 120-day period. This would have given the State three additional working days in
which to bring defendant to trial. The State was prepared to try defendant within the six days
but was unable to find a judge able to do so (R. 95-96; 289:35-37). Although the judge in
this case could not schedule the trial within six days, nothing in the record suggests that this
or another judge would not have been able to accommodate this case in nine days.1 In light
of the severity of the remedy available to defendant in this case, the prosecutor's lack of
responsibility for three of the four lengthy delays in this case, and the absence of anything

l

The hearing was held on a Monday, and nine days would have expired on the
Wednesday of the following week. The record reflects only that the judge in this case had
"trials set for the rest of the week[,]" and gives no indication about the state of the court's
calendar for the following week (R. 289:33).
4

to suggest that trial could not be had within nine days of the hearing date, reversal is
warranted.
Defendant contends, without supporting authority or analysis, that the State already
had the full nine days to bring the case to trial and failed, negating any need for a remand.
Br. of Aplee. at 13 n.7. However, because of the timing of defendant's motion and the
hearing thereon, as well as the three-day error made by the court in calculating the statutory
period at that hearing, the prosecutor had no reason to believe he had more than six days
within which to act. Because the court and the parties contemplated that only trial within six
days would satisfy the statute, the State should not be penalized for failing to schedule a trial
beyond that time.2

2

Defendant includes a chart in Addendum E of his brief purporting to visually
demonstrate the trial court's calculation, the State's calculation, and his own calculation
of the 120-day period. However, the chart is inaccurate in several respects. First, the trial
court considered and calculated into its decision only six days following the hearing on
defendant's motion to dismiss, not the nine days noted on defendant's chart (R. 289:3637). Second, contrary to defendant's chart, the State has at no time included in its
calculation of the statutory time period any more than six days following the May 15
hearing date. To the extent the period is relevant at all, it cannot be counted against the
State as defendant's failure to submit his order more timely is the sole cause of any
additional delay. Third, inclusion of the three extra days in defendant's calculation, as
shown by the chart, occurs without authority or analysis. Absent justification, his
inclusion of it is erroneous. His inclusion of eighteen days additional days is addressed at
Point 1(E), infra.
5

C

November 15-30.1999: Defendant's Alternative Basis for Affirming the
Court's Refusal to Toil these Fourteen Days is Specious, and His
Manipulation of the Calendar to Temporarily Suspend the State's Ability
to Bring him to Trial Constitutes "Good Cause" to Toll the Time
1. Defendant's proposed alternative basis for affirmance lacks record and
legal support
The State contends that the fourteen-day November delay caused by defendant's

request for a delayed setting of the preliminary hearing should toll the statutory period. Br.
of Aplt. at 12-13. In response, defendant presents two arguments, neither of which has merit.
Defendant claims that the trial court's refusal to toll the time during this period can
be affirmed on the alternative basis of the absence of a discovery response by the State. Br.
of Aplee. at 19. This is based solely on the following statement made by defense counsel at
roll call below:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We'd like to set this for preliminary hearing,
your Honor, approximately a month away, but (inaudible) discovery and
(inaudible).
(R. 285:2). The court then granted a hearing date for twenty-eight days later (id.).
This Court may affirm a trial court's ruling on an alternative ground where that
ground is "apparent on the record" and is sufficiently briefed by the appellee. State v.
Chevre, 2000 UT App. 6, f 12, 994 P.2d 1278. Neither of these requirements has been met.
Defendant's claim that discovery had not been received is not "apparent on the
record." The record demonstrates that defense counsel requested discovery four days before
roll call occurred (R. 12-13). In that discovery request, defendant requested that the
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discovery "be provided to defense counsel . . . no later than three days prior to roll call
presently set for November 2, 1999" (R. 12). Thereafter, in his argument on his motion to
dismiss, defense counsel could not remember what he had said about discovery and did not
remember whether he had received discovery before roll call (R. 289:28). The trial court
made no discovery-related ruling below. Nothing in the record indicates that the prosecutor
did not meet defendant's demand or that she delayed in releasing the discovery material to
a degree justifying a fourteen-day delay in the prosecution of this case. Hence, there is no
record basis for defendant's argument.
Further, defendant fails to sufficiently brief the point where he concedes that he
sought to delay the preliminary hearing, and he provides no record evidence that his
discovery request had not been complied with and no authority that such a situation justifies
a continuance of a preliminary hearing. Accordingly, defendant's argument is specious and
fails for lack of merit.
2. Defendant's manipulation of the preliminary hearing setting to the
State's detriment constitutes "good cause" to toll the statutory period and
should not be sanctioned
Where a defendant unduly delays matters, the delay may be charged against him and
the 120-day period extended. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916; State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325,
1329-30 (Utah 1986); State v. Velasquez. 641 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1982).
Defendant claims that he has an inalienable right to a preliminary hearing which
cannot toll the statutory time period. Br. of Aplee. at 19-21. The State has never sought to
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deny defendant that right. The speedy trial statute necessarily contemplates the holding of
a preliminary hearing in a timely and appropriate fashion. However, defendant's exercise
of his right to a preliminary hearing can, under proper circumstances, act to toll the statutory
time period. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916. In Heaton, defendant waived his preliminary
hearing, appeared thirty days later on the date set for trial, then changed his mind and
asserted his right. Id They conducted the preliminary hearing in lieu of the trial, defendant
was bound over, and an arraignment was set for eighteen days later. Id. Asa new trial date
could not even be considered until after the arraignment, the eighteen-day-delay was found
to toll the statutory time period. Id.
Similarly, defendant here chose not to avail himself of a preliminary hearing within
ten days, as provided by Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(g)(2). Instead, he unilaterally
sought a delay in the proceedings for reasons known only to him, and succeeded in
suspending the prosecutor's ability to comply with the speedy trial statute for fourteen days.
But for defendant's manipulation of the trial court's calendar, the preliminary hearing would
have been held at least eighteen days earlier-three days before the effective date of his
disposition notice. As in Heaton, the delay in the scheduling of the preliminary hearing was
solely attributable to defendant's manipulation and therefore constitutes "good cause" for the
tolling of the statutory time period. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 914; see also Velasquez, 641
P.2datll6.
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D.

Feb, 1-24, 2000: Both the absence from the preliminary hearing of a
witness necessary only to the defense and the accommodation of defense
counsel's schedule constitute "good cause" to toll the time period
Defendant contends that the trial court properly refused to toll the period between

February 1 and 24 for three reasons: 1) a necessary witness was absent from the preliminary
hearing; 2) the prosecutor required a 9:00 a.m. setting; and 3) the prosecutor failed to insist
on an earlier setting. Br. of Aplee. at 26-28. The first reason is solely attributable to
defendant as the witness was necessary only to him, and defendant admitted below he should
have known the witness would not be present (R. 286:4-6, 72). The second reason has no
record support where the prosecutor's choice of a 9:00 a.m. setting was simply the "better"
of two times offered by the trial court and not a requirement (R. 286:71). The third reason
does not support the trial court's refusal to toll the time as the prosecutor has no duty to insist
on a trial setting which cannot be accommodated by opposing counsel or the court, and
defendant presents no authority to the contrary. Moreover, none of these reasons is relevant
to the reason for the delay between February 1 and 24.
The trial court stopped the January 20 preliminary hearing because the judge had
another commitment (R. 286:71), and continued the hearing because of both the commitment
and defendant's need to subpoena Officer Geer (R. 286:5, 71-72). In so doing, the court
noted that February 1 was the next date available to schedule the remainder of the hearing
(R. 286:71). Consequently, the court's other commitments and the need for Officer Geer's
presence would have necessitated a delay from January 20 to February 1. The prosecutor
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was available on that date (id.). However, defense counsel was unavailable on that date due
to an unspecified scheduling conflict (id.). Accordingly, the sole reason the hearing was not
set for February 1 but was set at the next available court date of February 24 was to
accommodate defense counsel's schedule.

As the final twenty-three day delay was

attributable solely to defense counsel, the delay constitutes "good cause" as a matter of law
and tolls the statutory period under section 77-29-1. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917 (extending
the trial date, even in part, to accommodate defense counsel's schedule "constitutes 'good
cause' under section 77-29-1(3) and (4)"); State v. Bonnv. 477 P.2d 147, 148 (Utah 1970)
(same).
E.

Defendant's Attempt to Add Eighteen Days to the Calculation Fails
Because it Lacks Supporting Record Evidence and is Contrary to Case
Law
Defendant attempts to add eighteen days to the trial court's calculation by arguing that

the 120-day period began to run on October 28 instead of November 15. Br. of Aplee. at 2124. His claim fails as it has no record support and is contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Heaton.
The record reflects that defendant signed his disposition notice on October 28, 1999
(R. 45), and that someone at the prison received it on November 15, 1999 (id.).3 Despite

3

The specific date indicated on the stamp was unclear to the court and counsel
below (R. 42; 289: 4, 10, 12, 14, 15, 32). Without objection from the parties, the trial
court settled on November 15 as the date of receipt, making November 16 the "operative
date to begin calculating the 120-day period" (R. 289:32).
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defendant's repeated assertions that he delivered his written notice to prison authorities the
same day he executed it (R. 39-40; 289:4, 10), and his argument that delivery should be
implied as of that date because of the prison's allegedly slow handling of the related
paperwork thereafter (Br. of Aplee. at 22-24), there is no evidence establishing a delivery to
prison authorities any earlier than the November 15 prison stamp (R. 42; 289:12-13). If the
execution and delivery date are assumed to be the same in this case, the assumption would
apply to all cases, thereby defeating the statutory language. As the record does not support
defendant's claim that he delivered the document on October 28, his claim fails.
Further, in Heaton, the Utah Supreme Court held that although defendant completed
his disposition request on August 25, 1994, "the 120-day disposition period commenced on
September 3, 1994, the date on which an authorized agent at the prison received Heaton's
written notice." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916. This Court is obligated by principles of stare
decisis to follow supreme court decisions. See State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393,399 n.3 (Utah
1994), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 1115 (1995). Pursuant to Heaton. the 120-day disposition
period in this case necessarily began on November 15, as determined by the trial court, and
defendant's claim to the contrary is without merit.4

4

While the trial court was correct in determining that the 120-day period would
normally commence on November 15, the State contends that the period was tolled to and
including November 30-the date on which defendant's preliminary hearing was originally
set. See Point IC, supra.
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POINT II
DEFENDANT'S OWN FAILURE TO INCLUDE WITHIN THE SCOPE
OF HIS DISPOSITION REQUEST TWO OF THE CHARGES
AGAINST HIM DID NOT TRIGGER THE STATUTE AS TO THOSE
CHARGES
Defendant must provide certain specific information in a written disposition request
in order to trigger application of the speedy trial statute. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1. As the
pre-printed document entitled "Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges(s)
[sic]" purports to contain all the requisite information pursuant to section 77-29-1(1), the
prosecutor is justified in relying on the information in the written notice in determining the
scope of the disposition request. As the request referred only to the "clandestine lab" charge,
it did not trigger the speedy trial statute as to the remaining two charges. See Br. of Aplt. at
15-19.
Moreover, while defendant argues that his disposition request and the "Office
Memorandum" which accompanied it encompass all three charges, he fails to recognize that,
by its language, the memorandum was directed to the prison authorities and does not appear
to be part of the disposition information forwarded to the prosecutor. The document is
entitled "Division of Institutional Operations - Office Memorandum" and reflects that the
"Records Office" directs "Wastach [sic] Records" to "read and sign the attached (two
pages)" (R. 45). It also directs that someone "Attach a signed & witnessed money transfer"
to the memorandum, presumably for the prison's use in charging defendant's account for the
cost of mailing the disposition notice (R. 45, 47). As it purports only to direct prison
12

authorities in their processing of the disposition request, there is no reason to believe that it
was included in the detainer documents sent to the prosecutor. This is supported by the fact
that the prison's cover letter to the district attorney references defendant's disposition request
and notes only two enclosures (R. 46). The logical inference is that the enclosures consisted
of the disposition request and the "Certificate of Inmate Status" as these two documents
contain the information called for in section 77-29-1(1) and (2) (R. 42-43). The prosecutor
cannot use the memorandum to assess the scope of the disposition request if he never
received it.
Even if the "Office Memorandum" is considered in conjunction with the disposition
request, it supports the State's argument in its opening brief that defendant failed to
adequately comply with section 77-29-1(1), preventing the statute from applying to two of
the three charges. In completing both the memorandum and the notice, defendant
demonstrated that he knew the court and the case number of the proceedings dealing with the
clandestine lab charge, knew there were multiple charges against him, and knew the nature
of the charges differed (R. 42, 45). Defendant could not reasonably have acquired such
information without also knowing the specific charges: the arrest warrant and the
information, both filed prior to completion of the speedy trial notice, included the court and
the case number and listed all three of the charges against defendant (R. 1-7). As defendant
necessarily had the requisite information in front of him to trigger application of the statute
as to all three charges, and the pre-printed form noted that he was to fill in the "fcjharges .
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. . now pending against" him, defendant was on notice that he controlled the scope of the
statutory right he was about to invoke (R. 42) (emphasis added). When, for whatever reason,
he included only one of the three charges in his disposition request-—omitting two charges
that were viable independent of the "clandestine lab" charge—he failed to give sufficient
notice of his intent to invoke the extreme sanction of dismissal under the statute as to the two
omitted charges. Hence, the time never commenced as to the omitted charges. See, e.g.,
Aranzav. State, 444 S.E.2d 349, 350 (Ga. App. 1994) (defendant's demand, which failed to
identify the charges upon which he demanded a speedy trial by name, date, term of court, or
case number "cannot reasonably be construed as sufficient to put the authorities on notice of
defendant's intention to invoke the extreme sanction" of dismissal; hence, the time never
commenced), cert, denied (9/8/94). There is no burden on the prosecutor or the court to have
to search beyond the speedy trial notice to determine defendatnt's intent in invoking the
speedy trial statute. Cf United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3rd Cir. 1998) (a
disposition request under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers which does not include all
the technical but essential information does not trigger the statutory period); see also Palmer
v. Williams, 897 P.2d 1111, 1114 (N.M. 1995) (to trigger the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers, the request must be "clear, specific, and unambiguous").
CONCLUSION
This is a case in which four separate delays occurred, none of which the State sought,
only one of which the State agreed to, and all of which were occasioned by defendant. Yet,
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the district court dismissed all charges for failure to timely prosecute. The State should not
be made to suffer the most severe "penalty" of dismissal with prejudice where it held only
minimal responsibility for the delay in bringing defendant to trial.
This Court should reverse the trial court's dismissal of the case and remand the matter
for trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of June, 2001.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

S C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of
Appellant were hand-delivered to Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, attorney
for defendant/appellee, 424 East 500 South, #300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this
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